Soul explains the functioning of living things. Engaging in multiple functions, soul resembles other things that have functions, and its own functions resemble each other. This suggests that soul enters into many analogous and disanalogous relationships.1 A preliminary view of how embracing the reflection in Aristotle's De Anima upon analogy and disanalogy is, and how complex a functional capacity may be, appears in this chart:
I Of course because the soul is imperceptible, it is spoken of through many images which also set up analogies. Plato and Aristotle have a wealth of remarkable images and similes for the soul.
Modrak 1987, ix observes that "Aristotle models his account of the rational faculty on his account of the perceptual faculty," but she does not take the analogy faculty contend with particularly problematic conformity to the pattern. Imagination has two very different sorts of object, the phantasma and the sensible thing that may appear by means of it.3 Moreover, the function and operation of imagination are hardly obvious. The locomotive faculty also poses difficulty because it works through a conjunction of other faculties: desire and cognition.
My discussion of faculties limits itself to the analogies and disanalogies of intellect and sense in III 4-8, i.e., to part of the above chart. Aristotle has built up to the account of thought through meticulous attention to the complexities of sense. He distinguishes various objects of sense (proper, common, and accidental sensibles), gives media a crucial role in both distance and contact senses (so tongue and flesh are strictly media rather than organs), has senseperceiving aware of itself, and has the five particular senses as sub-faculties of a single sense faculty that discriminates the various sensible objects.4 It is not generally sufficiently emphasized that Aristotle presents his account of thought by following up such features of sense-perception.5 I shall be back to the nutritive faculty. In fact, the five "foundational principles" that Modrak presents in chapter 2 as characterizing the "theory of perception" could be stated in such a way as to cover most of the faculties of soul, including the nutritive capacity.
3 Wedin 1988, ch. 2 argues against an object for phantasia, but the difficulty is in fact the heterogeneity of its objects. The phantasma is an image through which nonimages may be presented. Either of these could be said to be the object of phantasia. In some operations of phantasia, such as creative imagination, after images, or dreaming, we just seem to consider the images, whereas in others, such as memory, we tend to consider the things that appear by way of them. Note how at the lowest level of the "divided line" in Plato Republic vi, eikasia may either be mistaking images for the things of which they are the image or conjecturing about the originals on the basis of the images.
4 Modrak 1987, 62-71 and 134 distinguishes the "common sense" from the five proper senses. She has common sense only coming into play when several senses act as one. My interpretation views "common sense" as merely another name for the general or central sense faculty of which the five senses are sub-faculties. On this interpretation the arguments of m 1-2 aim primarily to converge on the conclusion that the five senses are sub-faculties of a central sense power. The treatments of taste and touch, the sense organs for which are deeply within the animal, are already preparing for a central sense.
s Modrak 1987 goes beyond seeking analogy of perception and thought. She says, "While formally distinct from the perceptual faculty, the noetic faculty is the perceptual faculty differently disposed in the sense that the latter is its material cause" (123), and "the noetic and perceptual faculties are related to each other as formal to material cause" (215n29). She does not trace the analogies and disanalogies. Modrak's construal of the "analytic principle" is insufficiently specific. She leaves it at supposing Aristotle divides up the features of the faculty under consideration, but she might have further recognized that Aristotle aims to get down to the most essential operations and features of the faculty. Hence, all that he really has to explain
